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ABSTRACT 
Ecological compensation is an example of a trade-off whereby loss of natural values is 
remedied or offset by a corresponding compensatory action on the same site or elsewhere, 
determined through the process of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). Ecological 
compensation actions are often criticized for having low levels of compliance: meaning that 
they are achieved only partially or not at all, while development activity proceeds with much 
greater certainty. Our research investigated compliance with 245 conditions relating to 
ecological compensation across 81 case studies across New Zealand under the Resource 
Management Act 1991. 
Our research shows that present tools and practice in New Zealand are not adequately 
securing the necessary benefits from ecological compensation requirements, with 35.2% of 
requirements not being achieved. Significant variation in non-compliance with ecological 
compensation occurs between different activities, applicant types and condition types, while 
critical variables within the planning process influence levels of compliance. Our research 
demonstrates the importance of understanding the nature of non-compliance and of 
providing a consistent and robust decision-making framework for the consideration of 
ecological compensation in practice.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Ecological compensation is a positive conservation action that is required to counter-balance 
ecological values lost in the context of development or resource use, and is an intentional 
form of trade (Morrison-Saunders & Pope 2013). Trade-offs are determined through 
Environmental Impact assessment (EIA) which provides a framework for decision-making in 
relation to projects with adverse environmental effects. EIA enables the effects of a proposal 
to be predicted and for the development and agreement of appropriate ways in which to 
mitigate them (Bailey & Hobbs 1990; Bailey et al. 1992; Marshall 2001).  
Evaluation of the use of ecological compensation internationally has found common themes 
of poor administration, failures of implementation, low scientific capability to deliver 
required outcomes, high risk of non-compliance and a lack of enforcement; reducing the 
effectiveness of policies and practice designed to safeguard ecological values (Gardner et al. 
2009; Gibbons & Lindenmayer 2007; Gillespie 2012; Hornyak & Halvorsen 2003; Maron et 
al. 2012; Race & Fonseca 1996; Walker et al. 2009).  This research paper focuses on the 
nature of non-compliance as it relates to ecological compensation. Of concern is that if 
compensation requirements do not materialise as agreed, then allowing those trade-offs does 
little but facilitate negative impacts on the environment (Bekessy et al. 2010). They also 
serve to undermine the credibility of impact assessment processes and environmental 
regulations if the outcomes realised regularly fall far short of expectations (Hornyak & 
Halvorsen 2003). 
In New Zealand, the principal legislation that relates to ecological compensation is the 
Resource Management Act 1991 (the “RMA”), which sets out impact assessment (termed an 
‘Assessment of Environmental Effects’ or AEE, outlined in Schedule 4 of the Act) within a 
sustainable management regime that mandates the avoidance, remediation or mitigation of 
adverse effects (Jackson & Dixon 2012; Morgan 2012; Resource Management Act  1991). 
Other than this broad mandate to address effects, there is presently no nationally agreed 
policy, guidance or legislation that articulates the concept of compensating for ecological 
harm through trade-offs, or that sets overall outcomes to be achieved (DoC 2010; Gillespie 
2012; Madsen et al. 2010; Memon & Skelton 2004; Turner 2000). For example, Borrie et al 
(2004) argued that practice in New Zealand was lacking in comparison to other jurisdictions 
due to policy ambivalence, implementation and enforcement issues and the lack of sufficient 
security measures available to ensure gains are realised and protected, noting:  
“we are profoundly concerned about this situation because it is already leading to the 
cumulative loss of New Zealand’s valued biophysical environments”. 
(Borrie et al. 2004 p.85) 
Assuming that ecological compensation in some form or another is likely to persist as a 
policy tool, it is vital to improve the levels of compliance with compensation conditions and 
to better understand the nature of non-compliance, such that improvements can be made to 
the pre-decision stages of environmental impact assessment to reduce risk of default 
(Marshall et al. 2005). This research focussed on examining the levels of regulatory 
compliance with ecological compensation requirements in resource consents. We investigated 
what factors contributed to variation in those levels through a post-project implementation 
audit, based on 81 case studies, assessing compliance with 245 conditions that specifically 
related to ecological compensation.  
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Definition 
A broad definition of ecological compensation for the purposes of this research was favoured 
in order to capture the range of current practice in New Zealand. Existing definitions were not 
appropriate, because they referred to matters that are not legally required in New Zealand 
including observation of the mitigation hierarchy and a goal of no net loss of biodiversity.  
The mitigation hierarchy places preference on avoidance of adverse effects, followed by 
minimisation of them and then, if required, the mitigation or offsetting of residual effects 
(McKenney & Kiesecker 2010). The observance of a mitigation hierarchy often occurs in 
practice in New Zealand (and indeed, is inherent within environmental impact assessment 
generally), but there is no statutory requirement or national level policy that requires that 
adherence to it be demonstrated. No net loss of biodiversity, which is commonly highlighted 
as a point of difference between biodiversity offsets and more conventional ‘mitigation’ 
(Brownlie & Botha 2009; Gardner & Hase 2012; McKenney & Kiesecker 2010; Moilanen et 
al. 2008). The goal of no net loss of biodiversity also does not exist in New Zealand 
legislation, although it is referred to from time to time in relation to specific cases.  
In the absence of an appropriate existing definition, ecological compensation is defined in the 
present research as: 
“Positive conservation actions required by resource consent, and intended to 
compensate for residual adverse effects of development and resource use” 
The compensatory requirements encountered in this research were referred to as mitigation, 
compensation or biodiversity offsets, were undertaken both onsite and offsite, and were both 
in-kind and out-of-kind exchanges. All shared the broad intention of counterbalancing the 
ecological impacts of the development in question by undertaking a project that had a 
positive conservation benefits (restoration, habitat creation), and were in addition to activities 
that sought to mitigate adverse effects directly (e.g. sediment control). Several requirements 
encountered would perhaps fail to strictly qualify as compensatory actions depending on the 
circumstances (e.g. translocation, which is considered ‘avoidance’ more than ‘mitigation’); 
however they were treated in the consent as being intended to achieve the same purpose, so 
were subject to the same assessment. The validity of the requirements is not the subject of 
this research paper.  
Research objectives 
The present research aimed to answer three key questions: 
(a) Determining compliance - what are the levels of compliance presently being 
achieved with ecological compensation requirements in resource consents? 
(b) Determining variation in compliance - does the level of compliance differ 
between different types of activities, applicants and conditions, and in what 
ways? 
(c) Determining predictors of compliance - what process and consent variables are 
predictors of compliance? 
Determining compliance 
A lack of policy goals in New Zealand related to ecological compensation meant typical 
policy evaluation methods (Bennear & Coglianese 2005; Laurian et al. 2010) could not be 
used for the present research. A case study approach was instead employed, whereby cases 
were assessed for their compliance with consent conditions. The assessment of compliance 
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was undertaken independent of agency monitoring records (often observed to be missing, 
incomplete or out of date) to ensure a consistent assessment across different councils. All 
conditions assessed were legally binding under the RMA – case studies that did not have 
specified enforceable compensation requirements were excluded from analysis. Projects were 
at varying stages of completion, but conditions were only assessed if sufficient time and 
progress had been made to assess it. Only the conditions that related to the ecological 
compensation were assessed, and were taken as a surrogate for goals of the policy tool in the 
absence of policy and guidance being available. 
Determining variation in compliance 
We determined that assessing compliance was the first step for this research, but that 
understanding the complexities of non-compliance was important as there is very little 
information, empirical data and peer reviewed literature in New Zealand on this important 
topic. Non-compliance is not typically uniform across all activity types, applicants and types 
of requirement (INECE 2009; Ministry for the Environment 2008; Shimshack 2007). In 
discussions throughout the country, most expert practitioners were easily able to recount the 
industries and other activity types that both dominated the consent application figures and 
those that were known to be non-compliant more frequently than others. Therefore, the 
principal activity that pertained to each condition was compared with compliance to 
investigate if there were differences in compliance between activity types in RMA consents. 
Applicants were grouped into 3 categories to compare relative compliance: public 
organisations, private companies and private individuals. A ‘public organisation’ for the 
purpose of this study included state-owned enterprises (registered companies that were 
typically former government departments, now operating on a commercial basis under the 
State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986) and agencies such as councils.  
Some types of conditions were widely considered by the experts consulted in the planning of 
the research programme to be more likely to be complied with than others, for reasons of the 
availability of expertise, resourcing and other variables. The 245 conditions were clubbed 
into two categories comparing conditions which were administrative and non-administrative 
(i.e. action-based). The conditions were then further split into 14 groups that aligned broadly 
with their goals or purpose (as in Matthews and Endress, 2008) and compliance between 
those groups was compared.  
Determining predictors of compliance 
The present research examined the role that variables in the planning process and variables 
relating to the content of the consent play in predicting or otherwise influencing compliance.  
Understanding this role is important for ensuring that the impact assessment process, as far as 
possible, manages the risks of trade-offs. ‘Process variables’ related to the impact assessment 
process (presence of a professional ecologist, early mention of compensation in the process, 
compensation proposed by the applicant, detailed plan required before granting and public 
notification of the proposal) while ‘consent variables’ related to the requirements in the 
consent and nature of the trade-off (timing of the compensation action, requirement for an 
RMA bond, requirement for monitoring by the applicant and the presence of a review 
condition). An assessment of correlation with compliance was undertaken for the following 
variables to shed light on critical elements of the impact assessment process with respect to 
managing trade-offs. 
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Process variables 
Professional input and assessment is widely considered to be an essential component of 
establishing and implementing robust exchanges in the context of ecological compensation 
(ten Kate et al. 2004), and maintains a degree of scientific rigour in respect of environmental 
management more broadly (Morrison-Saunders & Bailey 1999). The compliance of cases 
where the input of a professional ecologist had been engaged by the applicant was therefore 
compared with where the applicant had proceeded through the process without that advice. 
Early mention of ecological compensation in the process of impact assessment is good 
practice, as it enables a full analysis of the likely costs and benefits of the requirement 
(Morrison-Saunders & Pope 2013). Compliance in cases where there was clear evidence that 
the compensation had been discussed early in the application stages was compared with those 
where it was first considered very late in the process (such as in response to submitters at the 
hearing). Cases where the applicant had scoped and proposed the nature of the ecological 
compensation were also compared with where the council had proposed it, in a similar way to 
Bailey (1992) which distinguished between conditions that were proposed by the applicant 
and those imposed by the agency. This distinction was determined from reviewing the 
background information and officers’ decision report under section 42(a) of the RMA.  
Although it could be considered best practice, it is not a legal requirement that detailed plans 
for compensation requirements are provided to the agency prior to the decision, and for many 
reasons this requirement is delayed to a nominal period following granting (often, six 
months). In many cases, this approach has practical reasons, particularly for sites that require 
significant geotechnical modification. Delaying detail also enables the planning process to be 
sped up on the promise of more information to be submitted in broad accordance with an 
overall plan, but this promise is often not fulfilled. Whether or not a detailed plan was 
available at the time of decision was recorded for each case study. 
Resource consent applications are sometimes publicly notified under section 94 of the RMA, 
if they are likely to result in significant effects beyond the subject site (Resource 
Management Act  1991). This forms the ‘public participation’ opportunity commonly 
referred to within impact assessment and invites additional scrutiny from the wider 
community of a given proposal (Morrison-Saunders et al. 2001; Morrison-Saunders & Early 
2008). Compliance for conditions that were publicly notified was compared with those that 
were processed on a non-notified basis. 
Consent variables 
Timing of when a compensation action is required to be delivered affects the certainty of its 
delivery (Gardner & Hase 2012; Greer & Som 2010; Maron et al. 2012; McKenney & 
Kiesecker 2010; Walker et al. 2009). Requiring benefits from compensation actions to be 
demonstrated in advance of a project have self-evident advantages over those that are 
undertaken concurrent with or following a project. The timing of the compensation actions 
were divided between those which were required in advance, concurrent with, and required 
following the development, and their relationship with compliance compared. 
A bond required under section 108 (Resource Management Act  1991), an “RMA bond”, acts 
as a form of insurance on works required within a consent.  A cash or bank guaranteed 
payment is made up front. In the event of a default by the applicant to meet bonded 
requirements, the agency is granted the ability to uplift the funds and carry out the required 
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works. Compliance with conditions that were part of cases that had RMA bond requirements 
was compared with cases where section 108 had not been used in respect of those conditions. 
Monitoring of the actions and outcomes related to a project and the mitigation requirements 
that are present is a fundamental requirement of impact assessment follow up and good 
resource management practice and should be ‘extensive and long-term’ (Bailey et al. 1992). 
For each condition, it was recorded whether or not the relevant consent also contained a 
condition for the applicant or its agent to undertake monitoring. 
The inclusion of a review conditions is standard practice in RMA consenting, although they 
are rarely triggered (Milne 2008). The review condition is based on section 128 of the Act 
which provides for the issuing agency to serve notice on the applicant of a decision to review 
the conditions of the consent for a range of possible reasons, including unforeseen level of 
adverse effects (Resource Management Act  1991). We tested whether the presence of such a 
condition did have a relationship with compliance in this study, in that its inclusion in consent 
conditions would act as a deterrent to non-compliance, although it was expected that it would 
not due to rarity of usage. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used case studies to analysing compliance with ecological compensation 
requirements, which is a common approach in the literature to date (Breaux et al. 2005; 
Hornyak & Halvorsen 2003; Reiss et al. 2009). Case study-based research is valuable for 
examining, at a detailed level, complex phenomena in context (Cassell & Symon 2004).  In 
this research, investigation of a wide range of case studies enabled systematic micro-scale 
evaluation of EIA as outlined in Marshall et al (2005). The way case studies were selected is 
described, followed by the methodology applying to addressing each of the three research 
questions.  
Case study selection 
For this research, regional and district councils were asked via email to provide examples of 
case studies that matched our criteria (Table 1).  
Table 1.     Case study criteria for data requested from Councils. 
 
(d) Permission to have been issued between 1 Jan 1992 and 31 Dec 2010 under the Resource 
Management Act 1991 
(e) Permission to have pertained to a negative effect on the biophysical environment, including 
but not limited to: resource take, vegetation clearance, discharges to land or water, stream, 
waterway or coastal modification under a Regional or District Plan 
(f) Permission to have included a negotiation for ecological compensation under the Resource 
Management Act 1991 
(g) A reasonable time has elapsed, such that the activity for which permission was granted 
ought to have been carried out 
(h) Sites in which permission from both regional & territorial authorities were required are 
acceptable 
(i) Sites in which an outline plan has been submitted with respect to a designation are 
acceptable, providing the compensation can be clearly attributed to the activity that the 
outline plan shows 
(j) The compensation can be anything negotiated through the planning process; from planting, 
species translocation, financial contributions etc. 
AUTHORS’ COPY. ACCEPTED FOR IAPA 2013.  7 
 
Note: Permission can relate to private or public land and the applicant may be any entity, including a private landowner, commercial 
company, requiring authority and the Crown. 
Random selection was not feasible for several reasons: 
a) There is no central national repository of consent information 
b) There is rarely any recording of compensation requirements in council filing systems 
c) Information collection and consent administration processes are highly variable across 
councils 
The numbers of cases provided by the councils varied from one through to 12, with 110 
offered across all regions of the country.  Of those 110 cases, 81 had sufficiently progressed 
to enable compliance to be ascertained. Several prominent cases were also included at the 
suggestion of expert advisors to both increase the sample size and to capture important 
examples. The statistical significance of the sample size is not able to be determined, because 
agencies do not record the total number of consents issued with ecological compensation 
requirements each year. 
The case studies were located all over New Zealand, in every region of the country and all 
related to one or a bundle of consents issued by a district or regional council (sometimes 
both). The most common form of compensation action was planting, such as habitat creation, 
restoration or enhancement. Other requirements included pest control, financial payments and 
the formal handover of tenure to an agency (vesting). Many of the trade-offs were indirect or 
loose, where quite dissimilar ecological values were exchanged (i.e. stream diversion and 
riparian corridor loss in exchange for restoration planting of hill slope habitat). This scenario 
is common in New Zealand where quantification and demonstration of ecological 
equivalence is not mandated.  
Determining compliance 
Previous studies overseas have found that low levels of routine consent monitoring and poor 
record-keeping by agencies have made desktop analyses of compliance, based on requested 
monitoring files, inadequate (Hornyak & Halvorsen 2003; Reiss et al. 2009; Walker et al. 
2009). Reducing the reliance on agency record-keeping therefore seemed essential for the 
present research. As a result, the determination of compliance levels achieved with the 245 
conditions was generally undertaken onsite; supported by an independent review of the 
relevant consent files, consultation with stakeholders, and investigation into other monitoring 
and financial data held by the issuing council (e.g. transaction information for the purpose of 
tracking a bond or financial payment). To assess compliance, a multi-point scale (Table 2) 
was used, similar to those commonly used by regional and district councils in enforcement 
and in previous studies of condition compliance (Breaux et al. 2005; Environment 
Canterbury 2009; Tonkin & Taylor 2012). 
Table 2.     The compliance scale used to assess each case in this study. 
Compliance scale Description 
0 – No compliance No apparent attempt to achieve compliance with the stated condition 
1 – High level of non-compliance Minor or insignificant attempt made to achieve compliance 
2 – Medium level of non-compliance 
Significant effort apparent in meeting the condition, but falls short 
of full compliance 
3 – Satisfactory compliance 
Acceptable compliance that is within a practical margin of error and 
minor flexibility 
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The compliance with conditions was assessed on a 0-3 scale as detailed in Table 2, rather 
than a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ mark to reflect that degrees of non-compliance are often present 
and to make the dataset more meaningful. A score of 0 was given where no effort was 
apparent to meet the conditions, and a score of 1 was given when some effort was apparent, 
but it fell well short of what was required. A score of 2 was given where the requirements 
were clearly not met, but a substantial effort had been made, while a score of 3 was given 
where the condition was demonstrably met. If there was minor deviation from the stated 
goals then a score of 3 was still given. For the sake of consistency, the score reflects the level 
of compliance with the condition in question and does not automatically translate to the level 
of seriousness of adverse effect. For example, a failure to submit a monitoring report, which 
would constitute a high level of non compliance in relation to the relevant condition, is not 
likely to cause a serious adverse effect.  
Determining variation in compliance 
Activity, applicant and condition types were grouped and compared for their respective 
relationship with compliance scores in order to better understand the nature of non-
compliance. The consents were first divided into 10 activity type categories (see Table 5) in 
order to compare the activity type with the level of compliance achieved. It is important to 
note that each may contain elements of the other, such as subdivision consents that 
collectively included many of the other types of conditions; but the categorisation refers to 
the principal activity. 
Secondly, consents were allocated to three applicant categories of private company, private 
individual and an aggregated category comprising state-owned enterprises and public 
organisations to compare compliance levels between them. Thirdly, conditions were clubbed 
into two categories: ‘administrative’ conditions, (generally paper-based such as the payment 
of a bond, lodging of a financial contribution or the vesting of land into estate of an agency) 
and ‘non-administrative’, which were those that were conservation action-oriented and 
typically related to an active requirement in the field such as planting. Finally, they were 
divided into 14 categories (Table 3) in accordance with the type of ecological compensation 
requirement they related to. 
Table 3.     Compensation consent condition categories. 
Administrative Non-administrative 
RMA Bond Hydrological changes 
Mitigation trust Maintenance/Pests 
Plan content Restoration intention 
Monitoring Planting 
Consent notice/Covenant Fencing 
Vesting of land  Translocation 
Financial Payment  
Protection (restriction)  
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Determining predictors of compliance 
As outlined in detail in the Introduction, a list of 9 variables (Table 4) likely to have an 
impact on eventual levels of compliance was developed with the input of expert advisors and 
a review of the literature on the implementation of ecological compensation.  
Table 4.     Variables that were considered for each case, categorised as either process or consent variables. 
Process Consent 
Variable Explanation Variable Explanation 
Professional 
ecologist 
Was a professional ecologist engaged by 
the applicant during the process of 
applying for consent? 
Timing 
Was the compensation action was 
required prior, concurrent with or 
following the activity that has been 
consented (i.e. a development)? 
Early 
mention 
Was the compensation action was 
mentioned early in the process, or 
alternatively was it late in the process at 
around the time of granting in response to 
agency or submitter concerns 
RMA bond 
Was a bond required for the 
compensation works (i.e. under 
section 108 of the RMA)? 
Applicant 
proposed 
Was there evidence that the applicant 
proposed the compensation action?  
Monitoring 
Was monitoring required as a 
condition of the consent? 
Plan before 
Was a detailed plan submitted prior to 
consent being granted?  Review 
condition 
Was a review condition under 
Section 128 of the RMA present in 
the consent?  Notification 
Was the consent in question notified, 
limited notified or non-notified  
 
Data analysis 
The Chi-squared test was used to determine whether significant relationships existed between 
a response variable (the score attained in a ranking of regulatory compliance) and a range of 
predictor variables, as it has been used before in previous compliance audits (Bailey et al. 
1992; Hornyak & Halvorsen 2003). Chi-squared test assesses whether paired observations on 
two variables, expressed in a contingency table, are independent of each other, the null 
hypothesis being that they are. In this case, each (mostly binary) predictor variable was 
compared against the categorical response variable for the level of compliance attained. 
Under the null hypothesis, the compliance levels will be similar in the presence or the 
absence of the factor. However, differing compliance levels will result in a larger value of the 
Chi-squared test statistics and a smaller p-value. Chi-squares tests were conducted at a 5% 
level of significance, i.e. the null hypothesis was rejected if the p-value was smaller than 0.05 
(Agresti 1996).  
 
RESULTS 
In summary, the present research has examined 81 case studies, comprising 259 separate 
conditions of consent, across New Zealand, for the levels of compliance with ecological 
compensation requirements. For 14 of those conditions, it was not possible to determine 
whether they had been complied with or not so they were excluded from the analysis.  
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Determining compliance 
For the 245 conditions assessed, compliance overall was 64.8%, meaning that in 
approximately two-thirds of cases the condition’s requirements were met (Figure 1). The 
remainder were non-compliant to varying degrees [0 (15.2%), 1 (9.4%) and 2 (10.7%)].  
 
Figure 1.     Number of conditions compliance categories. Percentage values at top of bars shows proportion in 
that category of the total number of different conditions recorded in this study (n = 245). 
 
Determining variation in compliance 
Compliance varied significantly with consent type (X2 = 73.207, df = 9, P = 0.000) as shown 
in Table 5. Consents related to agriculture exhibited the lowest overall level of compliance 
(4.76% with a score of 3), whereas energy generation successfully complied in respect of all 
11 conditions assessed (100% with score of 3).  
Table 5.     The distribution of cases (%) across the compliance scale for 
different categories of consent assessed in this study.  
Consent category Number 0 1 2 3 
Energy generation 11 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 
Education 8 0.0 0.0 12.5 87.5 
Subdivision 104 8.7 11.5 6.7 73.1 
Resource extraction 30 13.3 3.3 13.3 70.0 
Recreational 14 7.1 14.3 14.3 64.3 
Water discharge 22 9.1 9.1 18.2 63.6 
Water take 10 0.0 20.0 20.0 60.0 
Infrastructure 18 27.8 11.1 5.6 55.6 
Waste management 6 16.7 16.7 16.7 50.0 
Agriculture 21 71.4 4.8 19.0 4.8 
Note: See Table 2 for a description of the compliance scale. 
 
Compliance varied significantly with applicant type (X2 = 13.243, df = 6, P = 0.039) as 
shown in Table 6. Public organisations and state-owned enterprises exhibited greater 
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likelihood of attaining compliance (75.51%), followed by private companies (65.49%) and 
private individuals (54.72%).  
Table 6.     The distribution of cases (%) across the compliance scale for 
different categories of applicant assessed in this study. 
Applicant category Number 0 1 2 3 
Combined SOE/PO 49 14.3 8.2 2.0 75.5 
Private company 142 10.6 11.3 12.7 65.5 
Private individual 53 26.4 5.7 13.2 54.7 
Note: See Table 2 for a description of the compliance scale. 
 
Administrative conditions were generally complied with more often than non-administrative 
(X2 = 34.022, df = 3, P = 0.000). Conditions that are administrative in nature were fully 
complied with in 82.61% of cases, which is significantly more often than those that require 
action on the ground (49.61%) as shown in Table 7.   
Table 7.     The distribution of cases (%) across the compliance scale for 
administrative and non-administrative conditions assessed in this study. 
 
Number 0 1 2 3 
Administrative 115 13.0 2.6 1.7 82.6 
Non-administrative 129 16.3 15.5 18.6 49.6 
Note: See Table 2 for a description of the compliance scale. 
The two categories were further broken down in Table 8, and showed that mitigation trust 
establishment exhibited the lowest level of compliance of the administrative conditions; 
however as there are only two examples they are unlikely to provide an accurate indication of 
expected compliance.  
Table 8.     A breakdown of the distribution of cases (%) across the compliance scale 
within the administrative and non-administrative condition categories presented in 
Table 7. 
Administrative Number 0 1 2 3 
Bond  14 14.3 0.0 0.0 85.7 
Mitigation trust  2 50.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 
Plan content  29 0.0 6.9 3.5 89.7 
Consent notice/Covenant  18 11.1 5.6 0.0 83.3 
Vesting of land 8 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 
Financial Payment  17 17.7 0.0 0.0 82.4 
Monitoring  22 31.8 0.0 4.6 63.6 
Protection (restriction)  5 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 
Non-administrative           
Hydrological changes 5 0.0 20.0 40.0 40.0 
Maintenance/Pests  38 7.9 18.4 18.4 55.3 
Restoration Intention  10 50.0 20.0 0.0 30.0 
Planting  58 10.3 15.5 22.4 51.7 
Fencing  17 35.3 5.9 11.8 47.1 
Translocation  1 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Note: See Table 2 for a description of the compliance scale. 
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Determining predictors of compliance  
Nine variables related to the planning process were tested for their relationship with 
compliance with the 245 conditions. Five variables that were considered did show a 
significant relationship with the eventual level of compliance attained (Table 9). 
Table 9.     Pairs of predictors with statistically significant differences in the distribution of cases (%) 
across the compliance scale, pairs are marked with the same symbol (p<0.5). 
Predictor Number 0 1 2 3  
Action required after activity 139 19.4 12.2 11.5 56.8 * 
Action required concurrent or before 105 9.5 5.7 9.5 75.2 * 
Action proposed late in process 101 27.7 11.9 15.8 44.6 + 
Action proposed early in process 143 6.3 7.7 7.0 79.0 + 
Action not proposed by applicant 84 25.0 8.3 15.5 51.2 º 
Action proposed by applicant 160 10.0 10.0 8.1 71.9 º 
Detailed plan not required before granting 182 17.0 8.2 12.1 62.6 ٭ 
Detailed plan required before granting 59 5.1 13.6 6.8 74.6 ٭ 
RMA bond not required  150 16.7 6.0 13.3 64.0 - 
RMA bond required 94 12.8 14.9 6.4 66.0 - 
Note: See Table 2 for a description of the compliance scale. 
 
Higher levels of compliance (X2 =9.911, df = 3, P = 0.019) occurred where the requirements 
were required before or concurrent with an activity (75.24%) of requirements were met in 
comparison to when the requirements were not required to be done until following the project 
(56.83%). The point in the planning process at which the compensation is first proposed also 
has a significant relationship with compliance (X2 = 34.236, df = 3, P = 0.000). If the 
compensation was raised and discussed early in the process, the requirements were met in 
79.02% of cases, compared with 44.55% for those that were discussed late in the process, 
typically at the time of granting.  
Compensation proposed by the applicant (and subsequently included in the consent) is also 
more likely to be complied with (71.88%) compared with that which is imposed by the 
agency or advocated for by submitters, with those conditions being met in 51.19% of cases 
(X2 = 14.768, df = 3, P = 0.002). In cases where a plan was required prior to granting, the 
compliance levels were significantly higher (X2 = 7.961, df = 3, P = 0.047) with 74.58% of 
conditions being met, compared with 62.64% where a detailed plan was not submitted prior. 
A condition with a bond attached to it under section 108 of the RMA is more likely to be 
complied with than one that did not require a bond (X2 = 8.083, df = 3, P = 0.044), although 
the percentages of 64.00% and 65.96% respectively were very similar. 
Table 10.     Groups of predictors without statistically significant differences in the distribution of 
cases (%) across the compliance scale, groups are marked with the same symbol (p<0.5). 
Predictor No. 0 1 2 3  
Professional ecologist not involved 65 18.5 9.2 15.4 56.9 * 
Professional ecologist involved 179 14.0 9.5 8.9 67.6 * 
Monitoring requirements absent 71 11.3 7.0 14.1 67.6 + 
Monitoring requirements in consent 173 16.7 10.4 9.2 63.7 + 
Review condition not present 122 16.4 9.8 9.0 64.8 º 
Review condition present 122 13.9 9.0 12.3 64.8 º 
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Notification 79 12.7 11.4 11.4 64.6 ٭ 
Limited notification 15 40.0 0.0 13.3 46.7 ٭ 
Non-notification 150 14.0 9.3 10.0 66.7 ٭ 
Note: See Table 2 for a description of the compliance scale. 
There was no significant relationship between the input of a professional ecologist and the 
eventual level of compliance; neither did a requirement for monitoring. Review conditions 
included under section 128 of the RMA were present in approximately half of the cases, and 
did not have a significant relationship with compliance; neither did the requirement for public 
notification (full or limited) of the initial consent application (Table 10).  
 
DISCUSSION 
Three research questions were posed at the outset and the following discussion deals with 
each in turn, providing interpretation of the results and comparing and contrasting our results 
with others obtained in New Zealand and internationally. The results show that two-thirds 
(64.8%) of conditions relating to ecological compensation are satisfactorily met. However, it 
is the nature of non-compliance with the remainder that is the focus of this paper; and in 
particular, the ecological implications of that non-compliance. The results go on to show that 
the level of non-compliance is not evenly distributed through the different activities, 
applicant types and condition types. Finally, variables within the planning process and those 
related to the final form of the permission that is granted, show varied relationships with 
compliance that are of interest to improving the practice of managing trade-offs within 
environmental impact assessment.  
Determining compliance 
The level of overall compliance with conditions was 64.8%, meaning that in two thirds of 
cases the condition’s requirements were met satisfactorily. The Ministry for the Environment 
(MfE) coordinates a biannual survey of local government agencies, investigating (among 
other things) levels of monitoring and compliance with consent conditions. The 2010/2011 
MfE survey reported that of the consents that ‘required monitoring’, 68% were monitored and 
72% of those 68% found to be complying with their conditions (Ministry for the Environment 
2011). Note that this level of compliance considered all conditions in contrast to our research 
which focussed only on compensatory conditions. Nevertheless, overall compliance levels 
found were of a similar magnitude.  
A compliance audit of several artificial waterway projects in Western Australia by Bailey et 
al (1992) found a similar compliance rate of 63% with conditions that related to the 
mitigation of adverse effects. Hornyak & Halvorsen found compliance rates of 44% and 60% 
for country road agency and general public wetland mitigation requirements respectively. 
Breaux et al (2005) found that an assessment of 18 wetlands saw 17 ranked as ‘good’ for 
compliance, with 8 fully complying with both permit criteria and ecological indicators of 
success (Breaux et al. 2005). This research suggests that better and increased use of security 
and insurance mechanisms, and research and innovation into alternatives is needed; as our 
research (like most) show levels of compliance that mean a large proportion of ecological 
compensation requirements do not eventuate.  
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Determining variation in compliance 
The heterogeneity of non-compliance across industries and activity types is best reflected by 
the contrast of compliance levels between agriculture and energy generation, which was 
extreme and appears to signal a need for further research as to the reasons for such different 
levels of performance in this study. In respect of applicants, highest levels of compliance 
were achieved by public organisations, followed by private companies and then private 
individuals. Hornyak & Halvorsen (2003) found, by contrast, the county road agency in 
Michigan, USA (a ‘public organisation’ with a significant degree of interaction with the 
regulator) was less likely to comply with requirements (44%) compared with permittees that 
were part of the general public (either ‘private companies’ or ‘private individuals’), with 
compliance levels of 60% (Hornyak & Halvorsen 2003). The data also showed that non-
administrative conditions are much less likely to be complied with than administrative, which 
reveals that although overall compliance compares favourably with national level estimates, 
that the nature and scale of non compliance with respect to ecological outcomes is inferior. 
These findings contrast with previous studies that found no difference in compliance across 
condition types (Bailey et al. 1992).  
Understanding the specific profile of non-compliance in an area can help agencies and their 
communities prioritise scarce education and monitoring resources, in order to improve their 
enforcement strategies (Hornyak & Halvorsen 2003). This research shows that level of non-
compliance differs between the type of activity, applicant and condition type; and indicates 
that regulatory agencies would benefit from understanding the relevant trends within their 
jurisdiction in order to ensure environmental impact assessment procedures take account of 
different trends and risks.  
Determining predictors of compliance 
Understanding the variables that are more likely to have an impact on the eventual level of 
compliance can help to inform and improve planning practice, and this assists agencies in 
managing risk of default through the impact assessment process. Of the 9 variables 
hypothesised to correlate with compliance, 5 showed significant correlation while 4 were 
weakly or not correlated.   
Factors with insignificant impact on compliance 
Variables which the dataset showed were insignificant in terms of a relationship with 
eventual levels of compliance included the input of a professional ecologist, the presence of 
monitoring requirements for the applicant or third party, public notification of the application, 
and the presence of a review condition.  
In most cases, the professional ecologist (if there was one engaged during the initial planning 
stages), did not appear to have been retained throughout implementation. This was difficult to 
determine due to quality of record-keeping in many cases, so was not part of the formal 
assessment. For example, if a report was produced by an ecologist a period of time following 
implementation, it could not be assumed that he or she had overseen the implementation 
works. The lack of apparent effect of a professional ecologist’s input may also signal low 
quality advice being provided to clients, or poor efficacy of the manner in which professional 
contributions are considered in project planning. Further research on these matters is 
desirable. 
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The presence of monitoring requirements in the consent did not have a strong correlation with 
higher levels of compliance, which was somewhat surprising. There are a number of possible 
explanations for this. The first is that the monitoring conditions were only met 63.64% of the 
time. The second is that the monitoring conditions were of varying quality and detail, from 
requiring a letter confirmation of works having met conditions at the time of assessment, 
through to detailed and long-term monitoring of water quality with appropriate feedback 
loops. Finally, there was evidence of reports having been submitted but not necessarily being 
acknowledged or acted upon by the agency, which may diminish the incentive to comply if 
there is a perception of a lack of oversight. Our results also showed that public notification 
had no significant relationship with compliance, and neither did the presence of a review 
condition.  
Factors with significant impact on compliance 
Where compensatory actions were required before or concurrent with the consented activity, 
the likelihood of compliance was observed to be significantly higher. There were very few 
examples of prior requirements, so it is not clear to what degree prior requirements are also 
stronger than those that are undertaken concurrently. It is also usually impractical to delay 
projects until after full outcomes of an ecological compensation requirement are 
demonstrated. At present in New Zealand, there is no formal framework to package advance 
mitigation programs as may be able to occur overseas (including species banking, wetland 
mitigation banks and credit trading in other forms). It is probable that an absence of 
regulatory certainty that the works will be recognised as compensating for a later activity 
dissuades developers from undertaking advanced works.  
Where compensation requirements were mentioned early in the process, and presumably 
better integrated into project planning including timelines, eventual levels of compliance are 
higher. The data indicates that compliance is more likely to be achieved if the full scope and 
nature of activities are determined by the time of granting consent. Together, the correlation 
with compliance of both the early mention of ecological compensation, and the detailed 
planning through the project planning stages is strong. This aligns with best practice for the 
purpose of managing trade-offs in environmental impact assessment, where systematic 
consideration of a project and detailed planning is viewed as critical (Morrison-Saunders & 
Pope 2013). 
The presence of an RMA bond on a condition had a significant positive correlation with 
compliance although weaker than most other measures. A weaker correlation than expected 
could be due to a number of factors. For example, bonds are often set too low, so that they are 
insufficient to pay for the works required. Where default occurs and a bond is in place that is 
unlikely to cover the cost of the works, the requiring agency may not undertake to take action 
as they will be required to meet the shortfall. Overall, bonds were only required in 25 cases of 
110 cases overall. For a mechanism that represents a relatively simple form of insurance, the 
low usage of the section 108 provision for a bond to be requested was surprising. Throughout 
the research, it was apparent the available security measures were often not utilised, and that 
further innovation into improving the range of these measures available would be 
advantageous. 
CONCLUSION 
The results of the research also show that there is a clear need to understand the complexities 
of non-compliance as they apply to trade-offs that justify development at the expense of 
ecological values. Our research showed that 64.8% of ecological compensation requirements 
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are met, and that there was significant variation in compliance across different activity, 
applicant and condition types. The significant number of conditions not complied with 
indicate that present tools and practice within the domestic field of impact assessment are not 
securing the necessary benefits from ecological compensation requirements that are required. 
Our research also showed that process-related and consent-related variables are often 
powerful predictors of levels of compliance. Understanding the nature of non-compliance 
will assist in improving the manner in which trade-offs such as ecological compensation are 
managed in environmental impact assessment.  
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